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Game Theory

1. Solution Concepts for Static Games

Complete information: Rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, epistemic foundations

[Game Theory] Chapters 1 and 2.

Bernheim, B. Douglas. “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior.” (PDF)Econometrica 52, no.

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Pearce, David G. “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection.” Econometrica 52, no. 4 (): –

Aumann, Robert, and Adam Brandenburger. “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium.” Econometrica 63,  no. 5 (): –

Incomplete information: Bayesian Nash equilibrium, interim correlated rationalizability

Brandenburger, Adam, and Eddie Dekel.

“Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge.” Journal of Economic Theory 59, no. 1 (): –

Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and Stephen Morris.“Interim Correlated Rationalizability” (PDF)Theoretical Economics, no. 2 (): 15–

———. “Topologies On Types.” (PDF)Theoretical Economics, no.

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2. Solution Concepts for Extensive-Form Games Backwards induction, subgame perfection, iterated conditional dominance [Game Theory] Chapter 3. Bargaining with complete information

Rubinstein, Ariel. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica 50, no.

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Manea, Mihai. “Bargaining in Dynamic Markets.” ().

3. Equilibrium Concepts for Games with Imperfect Information Sequential, perfect, and proper equilibria

[Game Theory] Chapter 8.

Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. “Sequential Equilibrium.” Econometrica 50, no.

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4. Signaling and Forward Induction Stable equilibrium, the intuitive criterion, iterated weak dominance, epistemic foundations

[Game Theory] Chapters 8 and

Kohlberg, Elon, and Jean-Francois Mertens. “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria.” Econometrica 54, no.

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Cho, In-Koo, and David M. Kreps. “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics , no. 2 (): –

Battigalli, Pierpaola, and Marciano Siniscalchi. “Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning.” Journal of Economic Theory , no. 2 (): –

Govindan, Srihari, and Robert Wilson “On Forward Induction.” Econometrica 77, no.

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5.

Jean tirole game theory pokemon "On the Need for Low-Rationality Game Theory." Mimeo (July ). University of Pittsburgh. Fudenberg, D., and D. Kreps. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior 8 (): Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information.".

Repeated Games

[Game Theory] Chapter 5.

Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information.” Econometrica 54, no. 3 (): –

Abreu, Dilip, David Pearce, and Ennio Stacchetti. “Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.” Econometrica 58, no.

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Abreu, Dilip, Paul Milgrom, and David Pearce. “Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships.” Econometrica 59, no. 6 (): –

Fudenberg, Drew, David Levine, and Eric Maskin. “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information.” (PDF - MB)Econometrica 62, no.

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6. Reputation Formation Reputation with short-lived opponents

[Game Theory] Chapter 9.

Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. “Reputation and Imperfect Information.” (PDF - MB)Journal of Economic Theory 27, no.

Jean tirole game theory pokemon food been made in the theory of optimal regulation of firms with market power. The progress in these areas largely reflects two methodological breakthroughs: game theory and the theory of mechanism design. 2 By the end of the s, the time was ripe for applying these tools to the major issues of imperfect competition, regulation, and competition.

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Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence.” Journal of Economic Theory 27, no. 2 (): –

Kreps, David M., Paul Milgrom, et al. “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma.” Journal of Economic Theory 27, no. 2 (): –

Levine, David K., and Drew Fudenberg.

Game theory raleigh: This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point.

“Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player.” Econometrica 57, no. 4 (): –

Screening and reputation in bargaining

[Game Theory] Chapter

Gul, Faruk,  Hugo Sonnenschein, and Robert Wilson. “Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture.” Journal of Economic Theory 39, no.

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Abreu, Dilip, and Faruk Gul. “Bargaining and Reputation.” Econometrica 68, no. 1 (): 85–

7. Supermodular Games

Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. “Rationalizability and Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities.” Econometrica 58, no.

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    Vives, Xavier. “Complementarities and Games: New Developments.” Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 2 (): –

    Topkis, Donald M. Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton University Press, ISBN:

    Van Zandt, Timothy, and Xavier Vives.

    Game theory youtube "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science.

    “Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities.” Journal of Economic Theory , no. 1 (): –

    Immorlica, Nicole, Rachel Kranton, et al. “Social Status in Networks.” ().

    8. Global Games

    Carlsson, Hans, and Eric van Damme. “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection.” Econometrica 61, no.

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    Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin. “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-­Fulfilling Attacks.” American Economic Review 88, no. 3 (): ­

    9. Cooperative Games Nash bargaining solution, core, Shapley value

    Nash, John F.

    “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 18, no. 2 (): –

     Shapley, Lloyd S. “A Value for n­‐Person Games.”  In Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. II. Edited by H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker.

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    "On the Need for Low-Rationality Game Theory." Mimeo (July ). University of Pittsburgh. Fudenberg, D., and D. Kreps. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior 8 (): Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information.".

    Princeton University Press,  

    Manea, Mihai. “Core Tatonnement.” Journal of Economic Theory , no. 1 (): –

    Non-cooperative implementations

    Binmore, Ken, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky. “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling.” RAND Journal of Economics 17, no.

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    Gul, Faruk. “Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value.” Econometrica 57, no. 1 (): 81–

    Perry, Motty, and Philip J Reny. “A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core.” Econometrica 62, no. 4 () –